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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendants agree with the Statement of Jurisdiction provided 
by Plaintiff Gate City. In further support thereof, Defendants 
note that the Summary Judgment from which this appeal is taken was 
entered by the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick of the Third District 
Court in and for Summit County, State of Utah, on April 28, 1989. 
The Court certified the Judgment as final pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
since it did not address claims of certain Defendants, namely, 
Jedd P. Jones, 0, Jay Call and Kenneth B. Colledge. Gate City's 
Notice of Appeal was timely filed on May 22, 1989. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Defendants respectfully submit that the Statement of Issues 
on appeal provided by Plaintiff Gate City is unduly repetitive. 
In the view of Defendants, the issues presented by this 
appeal can be distilled to the following; 
A. Did the Trial Court properly construe the Indemnity 
Agreements in its determination that they satisfied the 
provisions in the promissory notes and trust deeds providing 
for a release of Defendants? 
B. In so construing the documents, was there any issue of fact, 
both material and necessary to the decision, which was truly 
placed in dispute, by the competent submissions made to the 
lower court? 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Defendants submit that the only statute or rule whose 
interpretation is determinative is Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. For reasons explained more fully in Point VII. 
below, Defendants submit that the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated, section 57-15-8, dealing with the limitations placed 
upon lenders regarding increasing interest rates upon transfer of 
properties, have no bearing on the proper disposition of this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Beginning in about mid-1980 an entity known as Kilburn 
Vacation-Homeshare, Inc. (hereinafter "Kilburn") sought properties 
in the Park City area to develop as timeshare properties. During 
1980 and early 1981, Gate City Mortgage Company provided long term 
financing for several properties in the Park City area which 
Kilburn then apparently assumed. In connection therewith, Gate 
City became familiar with Kilburn's status, financial condition, 
and method of doing business. See, e.g., Record at 1550, Cook 
Deposition (11-21-88) at 30, 33, 34, 100 and 101. 
2. In the spring of 1981, Kilburn and Mr. Vaughn Cook, 
Vaughn Cook & Associates and/or C.C. International, companies 
controlled by Cook, entered into a venture whereby Cook would 
build and develop homes at Jeremy Ranch to be marketed as 
timeshare units, and Kilburn would market and sell said units. 
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See, e.g., Record at 1550, Cook Deposition (11-21-88) at 30 and 
deposition exhibits 6, 8 and 9. 
3. Upon being approached by Cook to provide long-term 
financing, Gate City Mortgage Company and/or Gate City Federal 
Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter "Gate City"J1 initially 
declined to finance the project. Gate City anticipated difficulty 
finding buyers for participation interests in the loans on the 
secondary mortgage market because of the institutional nature of 
the proposed borrower, either Kilburn or one of the Cook entities. 
Record at 1550, Cook Deposition (11-15-88) at 47-48; Record at 
1551, Jenkins Deposition Vol. I (11-21-88) at 63, 74 and 76, Vol. 
II (12-19-88) at 161. 
4. Instead, Gate City suggested a scheme whereby Cook would 
find individuals who would apply for loans in their own names so 
the loans could be sold on the secondary market but with the 
prearrangement among Gate City, Kilburn, Cook and the individuals 
that the loan would be immediately assumed. Record at 1551, 
Jenkins Deposition Vol. I (11-15-88) at 14, 16, 17, 45, 51, 52, 
-^Cook negotiated with Gate City Mortgage Co., a 
wholly owned subsidiary or affiliate of Plaintiff Gate 
City Federal Savings and Loan Association. The mortgage 
company made the loans, and immediately assigned the 
Promissory Notes and Deeds of Trust which secured them 
to Plaintiff Gate City Federal. For ease of reference, 
since it makes no difference for purposes of this 
appeal, Defendants use the short-hand reference "Gate 
City" when referring to either entity. 
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63, 74-76, Record at 153, Vol. II (12-19-88) at 126, 151-153, 
162-163, 210; Record at 1554, Cook Deposition (12-6-88) at 393. 
5. Cook obtained at least two loan commitments from Gate 
City in the fall of 1981, which set forth the terms of the 
proposed loans, including the annual interest rate of 18.75%. The 
first of these commitments, dated September of 1981, is set forth 
as Exhibit A to the Third Affidavit of Vaughn Cook, and may be 
found in Appendix 1 to this brief. Record at 1058-1059. This 
commitment was for a total amount of $2,200,000.00, which was 
sufficient to cover the eleven (11) loans of $200,000.00 each, 
which give rise to these consolidated lawsuits. Record at 1550, 
Exhibit "3" to Vaughn Cook Deposition. 
6. Cook began soliciting individuals, including these 
Defendants, offering them a nominal consideration for temporary 
use of their credit in securing such permanent financing with Gate 
City. He represented to them that Gate City had approved the 
procedure and each individual would receive a full and complete 
release from any loan obligation in connection with, or shortly 
after, execution of the loan documents and funding of the loan. 
See solicitation letters from Cook to Defendants exemplified in 
Appendix "H" to Gate City's brief. See, also, D. Smith Deposition 
(4-12-88) at 104-105. 
7. During the application and processing phases of Gate 
City's loan processing, Gate City turned much of the lending 
process over to Cook, entrusting its forms and documents to Vaughn . 
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Cook who supervised their execution. D. Jones Deposition 
(6-17-88) at 70-74; Record at 1553, Jenkins Deposition Vol. II 
(12-19-88) at 165; Stanley F. Jenkins Deposition (2-18-86) at 114. 
Some of the transactions were closed without a Defendant meeting 
with, or even talking to, any agent of Gate City other than Cook 
or an employee of one of Cook's companies. E.g. , Crockett 
Deposition (5-4-88) at 122; jRecord at 1551, Jenkins Deposition 
Vol. I (11-15-88) at 55, 56, Vol. II (12-19-88) at 164, 165; D^ . 
Jones Deposition (6-17-88) at 74; Eyre Deposition (5-6-88) at 
98-106. 
8. Each Defendant executed a variable interest rate 
Promissory Note payable to Gate City Mortgage and each Note was 
secured by a Deed of Trust on one of the Jeremy Ranch improved 
residential lots. A sample Note and Deed of Trust are set forth, 
respectively, in Appendices 3 and 4 hereto. The respective Notes 
and Trust Deeds are all identical in the pertinent particulars, 
except of course as to dates (though all were executed in a six-
week period from late November 19 81 through the end of December or 
early January of 1982), security (each loan was secured by a 
different property in the same Jeremy Ranch subdivision), and the 
names of the individuals appearing as borrowers (summarized in the 
judgment appearing as Appendix "C" to Gate City's brief). Gate 
City prepared all of these instruments. Paragraph 10 of each Note 
(which incorporates the language of Paragraph 17 of each Trust 
Deed) states as follows: 
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Transfer of the Property; Assumption. If all of any 
part of the Property or an interest therein is sold or 
transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior written 
consent, excluding (a) the creation of a lien of 
encumbrance subordinate to this Deed of Trust, (b) the 
creation of a purchase money security interest for 
household appliances, (c) a transfer by devise, descent 
or by operation of law upon the death of a joint tenant 
or (d) the grant of any leasehold interest of three 
years or less not containing an option to purchase, 
Lender may, at Lender's option, declare all the sums 
secured by this Deed of Trust to be immediately due and 
payable. Lender shall have waived such option to 
accelerate if, prior to the sale or transfer, Lender and 
the person to whom the Property is to be sold or 
transferred reach agreement in writing that the credit 
of such person is satisfactory to Lender and that the 
interest payable on the sums secured by this Deed of 
Trust shall be at such rate as Lender shall request. If 
Lender has waived the option to accelerate provided in 
this paragraph 17, and if Borrower's successor in 
interest has executed a written assumption agreement 
accepted in writing by Lender, Lender shall release 
Borrower from all obligations under this Deed of Trust 
and the Note. (Emphasis added.) 
Appendix 3 at Paragraph 10. 
9. Apparently, all the transactions also included a 
so-called "Indemnity Agreement" between Gate City and C.C. 
International, a corporate alter ego of Cook. Only nine Indemnity 
Agreements have been located, but it is unrefuted that all 
transactions were handled with the identical documents^, Record 
^Plaintiff Gate City itself admits in its own 
submission in the form of an affidavit from Mr. Cook, 
dated February 2, 1989, Record at 850, that Indemnity 
Agreements were used in every loan transaction: 
I [Cook] executed on behalf of C.C. 
International the "Indemnity Agreements" 
between Gate City Mortgage Company and C.C. 
International, (a representative copy of which 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", and 
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at 1554, Cook Deposition (12-6-88) at 291; Spencer Deposition 
(4-20-88) at 15 and 30; Smith Deposition (4-12-88) at 102-106. 
Each "Indemnity Agreement" recites that a loan has been made to 
CcCo International which corresponds by date, amount and security 
to the notes and trust deeds executed by Defendants. Cook's 
company, C.C. International, agreed in those Indemnity Agreements 
to pay or indemnify Gate City according to the terms of the 
document. These Indemnity Agreements were prepared by Gate City, 
each of which contained identical language added to the regular 
form pertaining to payment or indemnification of the mortgage. 
Record at 1047, 1052-1054, 1070-1079; Third Cook Affidavit 
(3-13-89) at Paragraphs 12 and 15 and Exhibit "E" thereto; Cook 
Deposition, Exhibit 30. 
10. A significant portion of the net proceeds from the 
eleven loan transactions were used to pay Vaughn Cook and his 
incorporated herein by this reference), for 
the sole purpose of indemnifying Gate City 
Mortgage Company for any liability arising 
from mechanics' liens and/or materialmens' 
liens on the subject 11 homes and lots in the 
Jeremy Ranch Subdivision which were built 
under my direction and supervision. (Emphasis 
added.) 
See, also, Third Affidavit of Vaughn R. Cook dated March 
13, 1989, at paragraphs 12-14, Record at 1051 and 1052. 
Nevertheless, only nine of the eleven "Indemnity 
Agreements" have been located to date. These nine are 
set forth in Exhibit 30 to the Deposition of Vaughn R. 
Cook (12-6-88), Record at 1554, and are reproduced in 
Exhibit "E" to the Third Cook Affidavit, which is 
Appendix 1 to this brief. Record at 1070-1079. 
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subcontractors and suppliers for the construction of the eleven 
subject homes in Jeremy Ranch. Record at 1051, Third Affidavit of 
Vaughn Cook, Paragraph 11, Appendix 1 hereto. 
11. It is not contested that at or shortly before each loan 
closing, the property securing that loan was conveyed by Cook, or 
by an entity he controlled, typically C.C. International, to the 
respective defendant(s), so that they could then pledge the same 
to Gate City as security on the corresponding promissory note. 
Record at 1050, Paragraph 7 of Third Cook Affidavit (Appendix 1 
hereto). See, also. Record at 1550, Vaughn Cook Deposition Vol. I 
(11-21-88) at 165, 166; Ray Fisher Deposition (4-13-88) at 31, 32. 
12. At the loan closing, Defendants executed Uniform Real 
Estate Contracts reconveying the Property to C.C. International, 
one of Cook's companies. Those contracts included language 
whereby C.C. International agreed, inter alia, (i) to take the 
properties subject to Gate City's mortgage, and (ii) to assume 
those mortgages and in some cases assume or cause them to be 
assumed by any subsequent buyer (Cook testified this would be 
Kilburn). At the same time, or not long thereafter, Defendants 
also executed warranty deeds (never recorded) which would have 
transferred the same property to Alta Title, Trustee, apparently 
in trust for Kilburn. Record at 1050-1051, 1053-1054 and 1080-
1088, Paragraphs 7-10, 15 and Exhibit "F" of Third Cook Affidavit 
(Appendix 1 hereto). 
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13 • Paragraph 10 of the Notes contains a due-on-sale clause. 
See Appendix 3 to this brief . 
14. Defendants were consistently and repeatedly told by 
Cook, before and at closings, that they were transferring the 
respective properties without on-going personal liability on the 
transactions. E.g., D. Jones Deposition (6-17-88) at 62. Gate 
City knew such representations were being made and in some cases 
witnessed the representations being made without ever attempting 
to deny or disavow the representations. Record at 1551, Jenkins 
Deposition Vol. I (11-15-88) at 23, 24, Record at 1553, Vol. II 
(12-19-88) at 164; Stephen Blaser Deposition (4-26-88) at 47-56, 
in Appendix 7. 
15. Following the closings, Gate City sent nothing to the 
named borrowers, Defendants, but rather, consistent with the 
representations made concerning the assumptions of the loans, sent 
all of the• loan payment materials, notices of interest rate 
changes, and similar notices to Kilburn or to Alta Title which was 
handling collection of payments from the sale of Kilburn's 
timeshareis. All payments made to Gate City on the subject loans 
were made by or for Kilburn. Record at 1550, Cook Deposition 
(11-21-88) at 166 and 167; Record at 1553, Jenkins Deposition Vol. 
II (12-19-88) at 162, 163; Record at 1433, James Clark Affidavit, 
Paragraph 8, Appendix 5 hereto. 
16. It is undisputed that after the loan closings with 
Defendants and their transfers of respective properties, Gate City 
-9-
made no effort to communicate with these Defendants for over two 
years, took no action to inform Defendants as to variable interest 
rate changes and at no time attempted to accelerate the loan based 
upon a transfer to Cook or Kilburn. Pusey Deposition (4-5-88) at 
95; Crockett Deposition (5-4-88) at 59. 
17. From the time of the transfers and loan closings, and 
for over two years thereafter, each defendant continued to believe 
and understand that he had been released from any and all 
obligations under the loan documents. E.g., Blaser Deposition 
(4-26-88) at 91-93; Fisher Deposition (4-13-88) at 88. 
18. In June 1984, two and one-half years after the loan 
closings and property transfers, after the real estate market had 
fallen precipitously in Summit County, and after Kilburn and Cook 
had defaulted, Plaintiff Gate City for the first time demanded 
payment from these Defendants. Record at 577; Blaise Johnson 
Affidavit at Paragraph 8; Pusey Deposition (4-5-88) at 95; 
Crockett Deposition (5-4-88) at 59. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court was presented with competent evidence, not 
disputed in any material way, showing that the conduct of the 
parties indicated that all parties to the subject loan 
transactions, understood going into the transactions that they 
were to be assumed and later treated those transactions as though 
they had been assumed, until the loans went into default in late 
spring of 1984, over two years after the loans were closed. There 
is no dispute that the notes and trust deeds provide for a release 
of the borrowers upon certain conditions beng met. Gate City 
contends that Defendants are not released due to an incomplete 
compliance with a technical provision of the promissory notes and 
deeds of trust. Defendants submit that the technical provision 
(written acceptance of the assumption) is adequately satisfied by 
Gate City's acceptance of the Indemnity Agreements, which Gate 
City also promulgated. 
Second, the trial court correctly construed the Indemnity 
Agreements. Those agreements are not ambiguous on their face. A 
review of the four corners of each agreement, taking into account 
all of the language contained therein, is consistent with the 
trial court's determination that they reflect an assumption of the 
loans by C.C. International. Gate City's proposed variant 
interpretations do not adequately square with the language of the 
Indemnity Agreements themselves. 
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Third, the conduct of the parties did not create ambiguity. 
The lower court had presented to it substantial submissions 
concerning the setting of the Indemnity Agreements. That evidence 
showed that the written assumption of the loans by C.C. 
International was consistent with the expectations of the parties 
and their actions. Gate City failed to raise any issue of fact 
truly material to the proper determination of Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, which was competently disputed in the 
materials presented to the trial court. 
Fourth, the Uniform Real Estate Contracts between Defendants 
and C.C. International are consistent with C.C. International's 
assumption of the loans. The documents entitled "Assumption 
Agreement" to which Gate City points in an attempt to raise a 
contradiction, carry no weight. Those documents were never 
completed and were never delivered to or accepted by Gate City. 
Fifth, C.C. International's intent to assume the loan 
obligations is adequately manifested by the Uniform Real Estate 
contracts it signed. Gate City's intent to allow such assumptions 
is manifested by the documents it prepared and accepted, in 
writing, including the Notes and Indemnity Agreement. 
Sixth, the lower court's decision is not dependent upon a 
determination of any disputed material fact. 
Seventh, the operative documents, all drafted by Gate City, 
do satisfy the requirements of a release. The Indemnity 
Agreements satisfy the provision of a written assumption of the 
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loan obligations accepted by Gate City. The notes and trust deeds 
do not limit the manner in which Gate City's option to accelerate 
may be waived. Gate City's conduct, at the time of the 
transactions, and thereafter, clearly evidences a waiver of any 
right of acceleration. Therefore, the Indemnity Agreements, which 
manifest Gate City's acceptance of C.C. International as an 
assuming party, adequately fulfill all remaining provisions for 
the release of the Defendants. 
Finally, the Summary Judgment awarded by the trial court in 
favor of Defendants should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
CONSTRUING THE DOCUMENTS. 
There is little doubt but that everyone, including Gate City, 
intended, believed and understood there had been assumptions of 
the loans and acted as though the assumptions had been completed, 
at least until some time in 1984, over two years after the loans 
were closed. It is undisputed that during this period all 
payments came from Kilburn, and that Gate City sent Kilburn and 
Alta Title all information pertaining to the status of the loans, 
including payment requests and notices of changes in the interest 
rate. Record at 1433, Clark Affidavit at Paragraph 8, Appendix 5 
hereto. But then, when the loans went into default, Gate City 
sought to back-track from its conduct and sought to rely upon a 
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technicality in the language of the Notes and Deeds of Trust to 
the effect that for there to be a release, the assumption had to 
be accepted in writing by Gate City. It is only fitting, 
therefore, that Gate City be held to the other technical 
provisions of its own documents. 
During the discovery process, Defendants learned that Gate 
City had executed Indemnity Agreements whereby Gate City accepted 
and agreed to the assumption of the subject loans by C.C. 
International, an entity controlled by Vaughn Cook, the person 
principally responsible for negotiating the terms of the loans 
with Gate City and the person to whom Gate City made the loan 
commitment before the loans were closed. 
Gate City claims that its Indemnity Agreement means nothing 
vis a vis the mortgage despite the specially-added language of its 
own creation to the contrary. On the other hand, Gate City is 
quick to accuse Defendants of sleight-of-hand, illusion, or other 
forms of magic or deception. In making such accusations Gate 
City, must ask this Court to disregard the fact that Gate City 
drafted the very documents it ridicules. It must convince the 
Court to disregard language which was added to the boiler-plate 
form, apparently especially for these particular transactions. 
Defendants' arguments, which Gate City ridicules, were 
carefully considered by the trial court, not once, but at two 
separate hearings, with the lower court having the advantage of 
lengthy briefs, affidavits and depositions. The Court took time 
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to deliberate on the presentations and both times concluded that 
Gate City had relinquished its claims against Defendants by virtue 
of having accepted the assumption of the loans. Defendants submit 
the material facts of this case are not in dispute and that the 
trial court correctly ruled as a matter of law that Defendants 
were entitled to Summary Judgment. 
II. 
THE TERMS OF THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS 
ARE NOT AMBIGUOUS. 
A. The Indemnity Agreements are not Ambiguous on their Face. 
Gate City argues that this Court need only find that the 
language of the controlling documents is subject to differing 
interpretations in order to reverse the lower court's ruling. 
Gate City's brief at 12. In doing so, Gate City apparently does 
not dispute the fact that each Note and Trust Deed provides, in 
unambiguous terms, for a release of the original borrower 
(Defendants) when a transfer is made, acceleration is waived, the 
assuming party executes a written assumption agreement, and Gate 
City accepts the assumption in writing. Note, Paragraph 10, 
Appendix 3 hereto. 
Gate City argues, rather, that its own Indemnity Agreement is 
ambiguous. Defendants submit that the form is not ambiguous. 
The beginning point for analysis of the Indemnity Agreements 
at issue is the long-settled rule of looking first to the four 
corners of the agreement to determine the intentions of the 
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parties., Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 
773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). As the Utah Supreme Court, in Ron Case 
Roofing, reaffirmed, M[t]he use of extrinsic evidence is permitted 
only if the document appears to incompletely express the parties' 
agreement or if it is ambiguous in expressing that agreement." 
Id. at 1385. 
Each Indemnity Agreement recites that C.C. International "has 
obtained from the Party of the Second Part [Gate City Mortgage 
Company] a first mortgage loan for the principal balance of 
$200,000.00," followed by a description of the particular property 
that secures this loan. Icl. Because the property description in 
each Indemnity Agreement, the date and the amount thereof, all 
correspond identically with the same details of each subject 
promissory note, it is evident that the loans being referred to in 
the Indemnity Agreements can be none other than the same loans 
made nominally and originally to Defendants. Removing all doubt 
that C.C. International is the new mortgagor, each Indemnity 
Agreement states that C.C. International has obtained a mortgage 
from Gate City. 
The next following language in each Indemnity Agreement 
relates to the fact that each property may be subject to 
mechanics * or materialmens' liens and that the parties contemplate 
not showing exceptions for such liens in making the mortgage. The 
document then goes on to state the responsibilities of C.C. 
International to pay or indemnify against such liens. 
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The final substantive paragraph of each one-page Indemnity 
Agreement then recites as follows: 
Party of the First Part [C.C. International] agrees upon 
demand to indemnify Party of the Second Part [Gate City 
Mortgage Company] for any loss, including, but not 
limited to, amounts paid in discharge of the lien, 
expenses of investigation, preparation for litigation, 
judgment, court costs, and attorney's fees it may 
sustain by reason of omitting to set out such lien(s) as 
an exception in the mortgage executed hereunder or by 
reason of enforcement of this agreement. The obligation 
of the Party of the First Part [C.C. International] in 
this agreement shall extend to the mortgage executed by, 
through or for the Party of the First Part [C.C. 
International] of assigns on the above premises. 
(Underlined portion represents typewritten addition in 
original.) 
Most of the above quoted material is part of the pre-printed form. 
All of the second sentence in this quoted paragraph has been 
specially added in typewritten form. 
Defendants respectfully submit that the language in the last 
sentence quoted, above to the effect that C.C. International's 
obligation to pay or indemnify "shall extend to the mortgage 
executed by, through or for" C.C. International. This obligation 
is consistent with the beginning of the document which describes 
C.C. International as having obtained a mortgage from Gate City. 
This agreement by C.C. International to pay the mortgage and 
indemnify Gate City is a further expression of the fact that C.C. 
International is assuming each such loan referred to. No other 
portion of the document relating to payment and indemnification of 
mechanics' liens is inconsistent with this conclusion. 
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Finally, each Indemnity Agreement is signed by Vaughn Cook 
for C.C* International and by Stanley F. Jenkins, Gate City's loan 
officer on each loan, for Gate City Mortgage Company, thereby 
satisfying the final requirement of Paragraph 10 of the Note that 
the assumption be accepted in writing by Gate City. 
To paraphrase the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in the 
Ron Case Roofing Opinion, at 1386, whatever the legal consequences 
of this language, it is plain and unambiguous. There is nothing 
in the other provisions of the Indemnity Agreement that would 
undermine the effect of this quoted material. This Court should 
find, therefore, as a matter of law, that each Indemnity Agreement 
unambiguously expresses the conclusion that Gate City Mortgage 
Company agreed to C.C. International's assumption of each loan 
referred to in each Indemnity Agreement. 
B. Gate City's Proposed Alternative Interpretations Lack Support 
in the Agreements and Record. 
Declining to discuss the provision at the beginning of each 
Indemnity Agreement which states clearly that C.C. International 
has obtained the mortgage, Gate City contends that the Indemnity 
Agreement is ambiguous simply because it is supposedly subject to 
other interpretations. Each of Gate City's so-called "reasonable 
interpretations" requires the Court to strain the meaning of the 
specially added typewritten language, pretend that it does not 
exist, or assume that this added language was intended to add 
nothing to the obligations of C.C. International to Gate City. 
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Gate City claims this typewritten language could mean that 
CeCc International's obligations to indemnify Gate City from 
mechanic's liens "shall extend to the above mentioned mortgage, 
meaning that C.C. International's duty to indemnify runs not to 
the owner of the property, but rather to the holder of the 
security interest." (emphasis added). Gate City's brief at 15. 
Gate City's interpretation would require the Court to ignore that 
this meaning existed before the addition of the added language. 
Gate City further claims that the Court could conclude that 
the paragraph means the obligation to pay and to indemnify runs 
with the land. This interpretation fails to explain why Gate City 
drafted language stating that the obligation to pay and indemnify 
"shall extend to the mortgage." 
The final "reasonable interpretation" offered by Gate City is 
that the language means that "C.C. International's duty to 
indemnify from mechanics' liens extends to the mortgage executed 
by Defendants as assigns of C.C. International." Defendants are 
hard pressed to explain how this interpretation differs from the 
ruling of the lower court. In any event, Defendants simply note 
the fact that the language of the Indemnity Agreement expressly 
states that the mortgage was "executed by, through, or for" C.C. 
International. 
Each of Gate City's interpretations utterly fail to explain: 
1. Why C.C. International signed the Indemnity Agreement in 
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the first place. (If/ however, it was assuming the mortgage, it 
makes perfect sense.) 
2. Why C.C. International is described in the Agreements as 
having "obtained" a mortgage from Gate City. 
3. Why C.C. International desired the mortgage to be 
executed without showing an exception for possible liens. 
4. Why C.C. International was willing to pay and indemnify 
against mechanics liens and why Gate City expected C.C. 
International to do it. 
5. If not an obligor on the mortgage, how execution of the 
Agreement by C.C. International would "benefit" it in the "conduct 
of its business" as recited in the Agreements. 
6. What end was to be accomplished by adding specially 
drafted language to the form which states that C.C. International 
will pay and indemnify as to the mortgage in the same manner it 
will the liens. 
7. Gate City's "reasonable interpretations" fail to 
explain, why the document states that the mortgage was "executed 
by, through or for" C.C. International. (Defendants have always 
maintained that the mortgages were not executed on their own 
behalf, but rather were in fact executed by, through or for the 
benefit of C.C. International. 
Gate City simply has not met these issues. 
Gate City also attempts to argue that the specially added 
language referring to "mortgages" is ambiguous. Gate City claims 
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that the document is ambiguous because only trust deeds were 
executed—not "mortgages." This argument ignores the fact that 
under Utah law, a trust deed may be treated as a mortgagee Indeed 
in each case the trust deed was treated as a mortgage and 
judicially foreclosed. Furthermore, Gate City's own preferred 
"Assumption Agreement" form refers to these very trust deeds as 
"mortgages." Record at 1009-1020, contained in Appendix "E" to 
Gate City's brief; Cf. Record at 1452-1473, in Exhibit "C" to 
Appendix 5 of Defendants' brief; and, Argument on pages 28 and 29, 
below. 
The foregoing shows that the only truly reasonable 
interpretation of the Indemnity Agreement is that found by the 
lower court. Its award of summary judgment to Defendants should 
be affirmed. 
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III. 
THE CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES DOES 
NOT CREATE AMBIGUITY. 
A. All Parties Knew that Loan Assumptions were Intended, and 
Later Acted as Though They had been Accomplished. 
Def smdants' Statement of Facts makes it clear that all 
parties entered into the loan transactions with the belief that 
the loans would be assumed. Vaughn Cook could not have persuaded 
the Defendants to help in obtaining the financing for Jeremy Ranch 
property without such promises. Record at 1550, Vaughn Cook 
Deposition (11-21-88) at 83; Record at 1548, W. Truman Ribgy 
Deposition at 29 and 35; R. John Eyre Deposition, at 45-51. Cook 
discussed this assumability feature of the loans with Stan 
Jenkins, Gate City's loan officer, in advance of the closings. 
Record at 1550, Vaughn Cook Deposition Vol. I at 54. Stan Jenkins 
was a witness on at least some occasions at closings where 
Defendants were told again that the loan would be assumed, and 
Mr. Jenkins did not refute this. E.g., Blaser Depositon at 47, 
49, 52-54; Stanley F. Jenkins Deposition (2-18-86) at 21, 24-25; 
Record at 1551, Stanley F. Jenkins Deposition (11-15-88) at 44-66. 
Stan Jenkins, in connection with the closing of the loan to John 
Forrester, Jr. and others, even agreed with Cook to carry a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract to Forrester for signature which 
recited that C.C. International, as entity Cook owned or otherwise 
controlled, would assume or cause the mortgage loan from Gate City 
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to be assumed. Record at 1050-1051, Third Cook Affidavit, 
Paragraphs 9-10 (set out in Appendix 1 hereto). 
B. No disputed Issues of Material fact were Properly Raised or 
Presented to the Trial Court. 
In reaching its decision that each Indemnity Agreement 
represented a loan assumption, the lower court had the benefit of 
not only the Indemnity Agreements themselves, but also facts 
explaining the context and circumstances surrounding the Indemnity 
Agreements as presented by the parties in their respective 
memoranda and supporting affidavits. Record at 703, 709, 838, 
975, 1047, 1089 and 1430. A careful review of the trial court's 
minute order of February 15, 1989, the transcript of both hearings 
held on this issue and the judgment of the lower court, reveals 
that the it affirmatively and carefully considered all of the 
submissions offered in reaching its decision that each Indemnity 
Agreement constituted a loan assumption. It can only be concluded 
that the trial court failed to find any sufficient or adequate 
evidence of a material fact that was genuinely in dispute. 
Defendants submit that a review of the record supports the lower 
court's conclusion. 
Gate City devotes much of its brief to try to persuade the 
Court that the Indemnity Agreements are ambiguous, without ever 
adequately showing that any fact material to the judgment of the 
trial court is truly disputed. Defendants submit that there are 
no such disputed facts. 
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Gate City argues that "when all parties to a writing 
understood, intended and treated [a writing] as something 
inconsistent with its express terms, that creates an ambiguity 
that must be resolved by parol evidence . . . ." Plaintiff's 
brief at 18-19. In further addressing this claim, Gate City fails 
to consider the conduct of "all" of the parties, ignores certain 
submissions considered by the trial court and misstates certain 
other factual points. 
The evidence is undisputed that: Indemnity Agreements were 
drafted by Gate City and signed by its loan officer, Stanley 
Jenkins. Record at 1553, Stanley F. Jenkins Deposition Vol. II 
(12-19-88) at 175; Stanley F. Jenkins Deposition (2-18-86) at 86; 
Record at 1052, Third Affidavit of Vaughn R. Cook at Paragraph 12. 
Gate City never produced any submission or statement by the person 
responsible for adding the subject typewritten language dealing 
with indemnity and payment of the mortgage which appears toward 
the end of each Indemnity Agreement or anyone who could even 
recall its inclusion in the Agreements. 
The only effort Gate City made in an attempt to create the 
appearance of a disputed fact to the Court below was to submit two 
affidavits of one Blaise Johnson, currently in the employ of Gate 
City. Mr. Johnson claimed that normally Gate City did not effect 
assumptions by using a document like the Indemnity Agreements 
here. Record at 829 and 960. Mr. Johnson fails to address any of 
the language expressly added to the Indemnity Agreement and 
-24-
obviously knows nothing about the facts and circumstances of its 
inclusion in the Indemnity Agreement. Not only are those 
affidavits lacking in foundation with regard to the intent of the 
drafter of the language, but the substance of the affidavits is 
conclusory. Id. 
In an almost identical situation, the Utah Court of Appeals 
recently held that such an affidavit is meaningless. G. Adams 
Limited Partnership v. Durbano, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 21 (Utah 
Ct. App., November 8, 1989) ("In essence, the facts detailed in 
Plaintiffs' affidavits remained uncontroverted for purposes of 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56, and judgment for Plaintiffs, on the record 
before the Court, was appropriate. See, e.g., Williams v. Melby, 
699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985). ('An affidavit which merely 
reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated conclusions and which fails 
to state evidentiary facts is insufficient to create an issue of 
fact.')."). Defendants submit that the affidavits of Blaise 
Johnson, Record at 575, 829 and 958, fail in the same manner and 
should be entirely disregarded on the point of what was intended 
by the Indemnity Agreements. 
C. Evidence Submitted to the Trial Court by Defendants Supported 
the Court's Finding of Loan Assumptions. 
By contrast, the submissions of Defendants support the trial 
court's conclusion that loan assumptions were intended and 
effected. 
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1. Gate City suggested the scheme to Cook in the first 
instance. Record at 1551, Jenkins Deposition Vol. I (11-15-88) at 
14, 16. 17, 45, 51, 52, 63, 74-76, Record at 153, Vol. II (12-19-
88) at 126, 151-153, 162-163, 210; REcord at 1554, Cook Deposition 
(12-6-88) at 393. 
2. Gate City acknowledges all of the Defendants were 
expecting these loans to be quickly assumed. Record at 1553, 
Stanley F. Jenkins Deposition Vol. II (12-19-88) at 162, 211, 225, 
236. 
3. Gate City also acknowledges Vaughn Cook testified that 
these loans were to be assumed, and Mr. Cook stated that he 
understood this assumption might well take place in two parts. 
Record at 1554, Vaughn Cook Deposition Vol. II 
(12-6-88) at 274. 
4. Vaughn Cook prepared and executed Uniform Real Estate 
Contracts whereby Defendants agreed to convey the respective 
properties back to C.C. International. Record at 1050-1051, 1061-
1068. 
5. In each Uniform Real Estate Contract between one or more 
of the Defendants and C.C. International, C.C. International, as 
buyer, agreed to take the property subject to the new mortgage in 
favor of Gate City, and C.C. International further agreed either 
"to assume, or cause the same to be assumed by any subsequent 
buyer," or agreed "to assume full liability thereunder and cause 
the same to be assumed by subsequent buyers." Id. The intent of 
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C.C. International to assume these mortgage loans from Gate City 
could not be more clearly evidenced than by those documents 
executed essentially contemporaneously with the Indemnity 
Agreements• 
6. As stated in Paragraphs 15-18 of the Statement of Facts 
above, after the loan closings in late 1981 until the loans went 
into default in 1984, Gate City communicated exclusively with 
Cook, Kilburn or Alta Title concerning all aspects of the loans, 
accepted payment from them and totally ignored and failed to 
communicate with Defendants, reinforcing their belief that the 
promised assumptions had occurred. 
Defendants submit these facts and circumstances show that the 
intent and understandings of the parties was consistent with the 
lower Court's ruling. Gate City's response to these circumstances 
raises no issue of a material nature that would require a trial to 
determine. 
D, Gate City's Supposed Factual Inconsistencies Do Not Survive 
Careful Scrutiny. 
While it is true that Defendants were expecting the loan 
assumptions to be made by Kilburn, this is not inconsistent with 
an earlier interim assumption by C.C. International. S. Blaser 
Deposition at 125-129, attached as Appendix 7. Mr. Cook had 
solicited Defendants' participation in these arrangements with the 
representation that Defendants would be released of liability by 
virtue of assumptions to take place. See, e.g., letters from 
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Vaughn Cook to Defendants set out in Appendix H to Gate City's 
brief. 
Responding more particularly to the twelve numbered 
contentions set out at pages 22-25 of Gate City's brief, 
Defendants submit, adopting Gate City's numbering, that those 
points are misleading or erroneous for the following reasons: 
1. Gate City's reliance upon the first Affidavit of Vaughn 
Cook, drafted by counsel for Gate City, ignores the existence of 
the Uniform Real Estate Contracts described above, which expressly 
set forth an intent and obligation on the part of C.C. 
International to assume the loan obligations. In his third 
affidavit, reproduced in Appendix 1 to Respondent's brief, at 
Paragraphs 15-16, Cook clarifies and explains the misleading 
portions of the first affidavit. Gate City's reliance upon the 
first affidavit without the clarification is unfair. 
2. Gate City's reliance upon the pages of Cook's deposition 
it cited shows not only that the testimony does not support the 
contentions for which they are cited, but in fact, at page 167 of 
Cook's deposition, Record at 1550, Cook stated that the loan 
"assumptions were to take place effective immediately and the 
payments were to be made by Kilburn." 
3-4. The "Assumption Agreements" referred to by Gate City at 
pages 22-23 of its Brief and set forth as an attachment to Cook's 
Second Affidavit, also drafted by counsel for Gate City, were 
produced during discovery from the files of Jim Clark, the 
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Gate City's Claimed Factual Inconsistencies, continued 
principal of Kilburn, There is no evidence that they ever were 
delivered to, or even seen by, Gate City, In fact, Gate City has 
consistently contended that such loan assumptions by Kilburn were 
never completed or approved by Gate City. More complete copies of 
these same documents, including the reverse sides, never 
completed, which were omitted by Gate City in preparing Cook's 
second affidavit, were included with Jim Clark's Affidavit, set 
forth in Appendix 5 hereto. Gate City's reliance upon the 
language of a document which never became fully executed and which 
it never saw is misplaced. Moreover, the language relied upon by 
Gate City is inconsistent with the language in Paragraph 10 of the 
Promissory Notes. 
5-7. Defendants do not dispute that they and Cook believed, 
from before the loan closings and into 1984, that ultimately 
thesesubject loans were to be or had been fully assumed by Kilburn 
with a corresponding release to Defendants. However, none of this 
negates an earlier interim assumption of the loans by C.C. 
International. See, Blaser Deposition excerpts in Appendix 7 
hereto. The fact that Cook was not fully aware in 19 84 of the 
legal effect of the Indemnity Agreements he signed in 19 81 
concerning C.C. International's assumption of the loans, also does 
not detract from the effectiveness of those Indemnity Agreements. 
This is explained in part by the fact that Gate City never told 
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Gate City's Claimed Factual Inconsistencies, continued 
Cook of this effect of the Indemnity Agreements and never 
presented claims against or to Cook or C.C. International, 
apparently because the mechanics' liens never materialized or were 
satisfi€*d by Cook, and because by 1984, Gate City apparently 
realized the futility of trying to collect money from Cook or C.C. 
International, which by then were judgment-proof or fast 
approaching that status. See, also, Paragraphs 15-16 of Cook's 
Third Affidavit set forth in Appendix 1 hereto. However, had Gate 
City timely asserted its rights against C.C. International for 
payment of the subject loans, one can be sure that Gate City would 
not so willingly have accepted Cook's assertion he did not know 
that by signing the Indemnity Agreements, his company had become 
liable on the loans. 
8. Again, careful scrutiny of the materials cited in 
support of Gate City's characterization of Mr. Blaser's testimony 
shows that this conclusion does not follow. In fact, Mr. Blaser's 
testimony, particularly at pages 125-129 of his deposition, shows 
just the opposite, that he did understand from Stan Jenkins and 
Vaughn Cook that the Indemnity Agreement did protect him. The 
cited pages of Mr. Blaser's deposition are reproduced in Appendix 
7 to this brief. 
9. The referenced affidavit of Blaise Johnson is completely 
lacking in foundation for the point asserted by Gate City. It 
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Gate City's Claimed Factual Inconsistencies, continued 
does not appear that Mr* Johnson prepared or drafted the Indemnity 
Agreements or that he was even employed by Gate City at the time 
the Indemnity Agreements were prepared and signed. No other 
comparable source of relevant, admissible testimony is shown for 
such conclusions. Accordingly, this affidavit should be ignored 
for the reasons previously noted at page 25, above. 
10-12. This self-serving description of Gate City's 
actions in 1984, while more or less accurate, simply does not 
assist meaningfully in analyzing the issue at hand, because Gate 
City's choice in 1984 to not pursue claims against Cook or C.C. 
International for payment of the loans, whether made with or 
without knowledge of that option, simply is too far removed in 
time to be probative of Gate City's intent in late 1981, when the 
Indemnity Agreements were prepared and signed. 
Gate City's arguments simply miss their mark. Even the 
current proposed variant interpretations of the Indemnity 
Agreement offered by Gate City at page 15 of its Brief are nothing 
more than mere speculation. There is little or no factual 
evidence in the record to support those proffered interpretations, 
which are offered for the first time on appeal. In this regard, 
Defendants note the holding of Territorial Savings and Loan 
Association v. Baird, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. 57, 58 (Utah Ct. App., 
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September 26, 1989), to the effect that "evidence not available to 
the trial judge cannot be added to the record on appeal." 
Therefore, even if this Court were inclined to the view that 
the Indemnity Agreements, considered alone, might be considered to 
be ambiguous, the summary judgment entered by the trial court 
should still be affirmed because all other evidence bearing on the 
issue decided by the trial court shows that the summary judgment 
motion of Defendants was correctly decided. 
IV. 
DEFENDANTS' ACTIONS ARE NOT INCONSISTENT 
WITH THEIR ARGUMENT. 
Repondents executed Uniform Real Estate Contracts, with C.C. 
International at or shortly after the time that the indemnity 
agreements were executed. As Gate City admits (Plaintiff's brief 
at 26), C.C. International executed Uniform Real Estate Contracts 
with respect to each property in question. Therein, C.C. 
International agreed "to assume" the mortgage or cause the same to 
be assumed by a subsequent buyer. Exhibits "B"-"D" of Appendix 1 
hereto. While the later assumption by Kilburn was apparently 
never completed, C.C. International's intent to assume the loans 
could not have been more plainly stated. 
That Defendants believed that assumptions had taken place is 
clear and undisputed. R. John Eyre Disposition at page 55; 
Stephen L. Blaser Deposition at page 54; Third Affidavit of Vaughn 
Cook, Record at 1049, at paragraph 5, Appendix 1 hereto. Gate 
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City argues that C.C. International only agreed to take the 
property "subject to" the underlying mortgage and that "subject 
to" does not include an assumption. This is strictly a strawman 
argument. The Uniform Real Estate Contract clearly states that 
the mortgages woul be assumed by C.C. International. C.C. 
International took the properties subject to the mortgages and in 
fact expressly agreed to assume them, either absolutely, or in the 
event that they were not assumed by Kilburn. Cook's execution of 
the Indemnity Agreements fulfilled this contractual obligation of 
C.C. International to Defendants. 
The timing or sequence agrument asserted by Gate City is a 
similar red herring. Most Repondents themselves had no 
independant knowledge at the time they signed loan closing 
documents, assumption agreements, and the uniform real estate 
contracts as to whether any assumption of the Gate City loans had 
already been completed because they had not seen the Indemnity 
Agreements and were not parties hereto. Since all of these 
documents were typically signed by Defendants at one and the same 
session, or at most within a span of only a day or two, they 
simply were not aware of the existence of the Indemnity 
Agreements, which only came to light during discovery long after 
the suits were filed. 
Defendants expected the mortgages to be assumed. The Uniform 
Real Estate Contracts provide expressly that C.C. International as 
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buyer agrees to assume or cause them to be assumed. Defendants 
had been told that Kilburn would assume the loans. 
Naturally, Defendants testified that they had been told that 
Kilburn would assume the loans. True to this, special language 
was added to the Uniform Real Estate Contracts to provide that 
"[i]t is understood that at such time as the underlying mortgage 
is assumed by buyer [C.C. International] or its assigns [Kilburn], 
then this contract shall be deemed fully executed and paid." 
The Assumption Agreements referred to by Gate City and 
preliminarily signed by Defendants, generally at the loan 
closings, are also not inconsistent with the Indemnity Agreements. 
Those Assumption Agreements were never finalized nor delivered to 
Gate City. J. Clark Affidavit, Appendix 5 hereto. 
V. 
A NOVATION WAS PROVIDED FOR BY GATE 
CITY'S OWN DOCUMENTS. 
The primary case cited by Gate City for the proposition that 
a novation must be intended by the parties is First American 
Commerce Co. v. Washington Mutual Savings Bank, 743 P.2d 1193 
(Utah 1987). That case states, at 1195: "a document could by its 
unambiguous terms provide for a novation . . . " 
This is precisely the case presented here. Gate City's note 
and trust deed specifically contemplate and provide for the 
possibility of a novation. All that is required is a waiver of 
the right to accelerate in connection with a transfer of the 
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property securing the loan coupled with a written assumption 
agreement accepted in writing by Gate City, Note at paragraph 10. 
The written Indemnity Agreements, accepted in writing by Stan 
Jenkins for Gate city, fulfill this latter condition. Nothing 
more is required, except the waiver of the right to accelerate, 
addressed more fully in Point VII below. 
Since Gate City prepared or promulgated the documents with 
the operative language in place, its intent to allow the 
assumptions is evident. The intent of C.C. International to 
assume the loans is similarly evident in the Uniform Real Estate 
Contracts. Therefore, no presumptions are even necessary. But 
even if they were, in such a situation, the lower court was 
entitled to use the tie-breaker doctrine of construing documents 
against the drafter to justify its conclusion, where all available 
evidence has been considered. Allstate Enterprises Inc. v. 
Heriford, 772 P.2d 466, 469 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). 
VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE NO FINDING 
OF A DISPUTED MATERIAL FACT. 
Gate City claims that the lower court made a finding of fact 
by ruling in favor of Defendants on the ground that copies of the 
Indemnity Agreements were never located for two of the eleven 
transactions. The facts, however, are nevertheless not disputed. 
Vaughn Cook states that all of the transactions were handled and 
treated the same. Record at 1052. No submission of any kind was 
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ever presented by Gate City to the effect that Indemnity 
Agreements did not exist with respect to these transactions. Gate 
City had the obligation to come forward with a submission to 
place this fact at issue and failed to do so. Therefore, it 
cannot complain of this now. Schaer v. State of Utah, 657 P. 2d 
1337, 1341-42 (Utah 1983). 
Plaintiff Gate City also argues that the lower court made a 
finding of fact that Gate City waived its right to accelerate. 
Such a delineation is no bar to the granting of summary judgment 
if the material facts are not in dispute. Gate City offers not 
one example of a material fact issue which would require a 
several-week jury trial to determine. If the facts are not in 
dispute, waiver is a matter of law for the lower court's 
determination. 
VII. 
THE OPERATIVE DOCUMENTS SATISFY THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF A RELEASE. 
These Defendants have been released from the Notes and Trust 
Deeds. Each of the Trust Deeds and Promissory Notes contain 
provisions calling for the release of the Defendant Borrowers upon 
assumption of the mortgages. Paragraph 17 of the Trust Deed and 
Paragraph 10 of the Note provide as follows: 
17. Transfer of the Property; Assumption. If all of 
any part of the Property or an interest therein is sold 
or transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior 
written consent, excluding (a) the creation of a lien of 
encumbrance subordinate to this Deed of Trust, (b) the 
creation of a purchase money security interest for 
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household appliances, (c) a transfer by devise, descent 
or by operation of law upon the death of a joint tenant 
or (d) the grant of any leasehold interest of three 
years or less not containing an option to purchase, 
Lender may, at Lender's option, declare all the sums 
secured by this Deed of Trust to be immediately due and 
payable. Lender shall have waived such option to 
accelerate if, prior to the sale or transfer, Lender and 
the person to whom the Property is to be sold or 
transferred reach agreement in writing that the credit 
of such person is satisfactory to Lender and that the 
interest payable on the sums secured by this Deed of 
Trust shall be at such rate as Lender shall request. If 
Lender has waived the option to accelerate provided in 
this paragraph 17, and if Borrower's successor in 
interest has executed a written assumption agreement 
accepted in writing by Lender, Lender shall release 
Borrower from all obligations under this Deed of Trust 
and the Note. (Emphasis added.) 
As can be seen from this operative language, the Lender (Gate 
City) "shall release the Borrower" (Defendants) "[i]f Lender has 
waived the option to accelerate provided in . . . Paragraph 17, 
and if Borrower's successor in interest has executed a written 
assumption agreement accepted in writing by Lender . . . . " 
According to Gate City's own documents, therefore, Defendants 
are released if (i) there has been a transfer of the property by 
Defendants and Gate City has waived its right to not accelerate 
the loan and (ii) the Borrower has executed a written assumption 
agreement accepted in writing by Gate City. 
A. The Right to Accelerate upon Transfer was Waived, Because 
Prior to Transfer, Gate City gave its Written Consent to the 
Transfer. 
The due-on-sale clause (Paragraph 17 of the Trust Deed) 
cannot be exercised if Gate City gave prior written consent to the 
transfer. Paragraph 17 provides in part that 
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" [i]f all or any part of the property or an interest 
therein is sold without Lender's prior written consent. 
. . [the due-on-sale right may be asserted]. . . . " 
Thus, it is only in the event that prior written consent is given, 
the right to accelerate does not arise. In this case, Gate City 
gave prior written consent and, therefore, the right to accelerate 
was waived at the outset, or more accurately, never existed. 
The written consent Defendants refer to is contained in the 
"Indemnity Agreement" wherein Gate City agreed that C.C. 
International obtained the loan from Gate City: 
Whereas the Party of the First Part [C.C. International] 
has obtained from Party of the Second Part [Gate City] a 
first mortgage loan. ..." 
Record at 1070-1079, Exhibit 3 to Appendix 1 hereto. 
Even if the Indemnity Agreement were nothing more than an 
agreement to indemnify against mechanics liens' in consideration 
of Gate City agreeing to the mortgage without showing exceptions, 
it is obvious that by executing this sort of agreement with C.C. 
International, Gate City recognized C.C. International as a 
mortgagor and could not have reserved a right to accelerate the 
loan on the ground that C.C. International was the transferee. 3 
^Moreover, the loan commitment agreement made by 
Gate City Mortgage Company to Vaughn Cook and accepted 
by him as president of Vaughn Cook & Associates on 
September 28, 1981, pertaining to all eleven loans at 
issue, specifically addressed all material terms of each 
loan, including the interest rate of 18.75% per annum. 
See Exhibit "A" to Third Cook Affidavit, Appendix 1 hereto. 
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B. If Gate City ever had a Right to Accelerate, it has Waived 
it-
Paragraph 17 provides for a method of waiving the 
acceleration right in writing prior to transfer but leaves to 
ordinary contract construction whether a given act constitutes a 
waiver after transfer. Defendants have argued above that the 
Indemnity Agreement as interpreted by either the trial court or 
Defendants constitutes a prior written waiver of the acceleration 
clause. Assuming, arguendo, that there had been no such waiver, 
it is clear that if Gate City ever had the right to accelerate 
based upon the due-on-sale clause, it subsequently waived it. 
In each case the lender, Gate City, was aware that the 
property was being transferred by the borrower upon execution of 
the loan documents. Vaughn Cook negotiated the terms of each of 
these loans with Gate City. Third Affidavit of Vaughn R. Cook, 
dated March 13, 1989, at Paragraphs 2-3. Record at 1048-1049. 
Stanley F. Jenkins, the loan officer for Gate City Mortgage 
Company, who originated each of the subject loans for Gate City, 
knew before the first loan closed that: (1) each of the 
properties securing these loans was to be conveyed by the 
Defendant Borrower at or shortly after closing, (2) after closing, 
the properties would be used by Kilburn in its timeshare program, 
and (3) Kilburn would be making all of the payments thereon. 
Deposition of Stanley F. Jenkins, (11-15-88) at 62-63, also 
(12/19/88) at 161-163, attached hereto as Appendix 6. Moreover, 
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all of this information concerning transfer by the Borrowers was 
undisputedly conveyed to Mr. Jenkins1 superiors at Gate City in 
North Dakota. Jenkins Deposition (12/19/88) at 149-153, attached 
hereto as Appendix 6. Therefore, it is obvious that Gate City was 
well-informed of the intended transfers which could have 
supposedly triggered any due-on-sale election had no prior consent 
been given. 
Before the loans were closed, Gate City's loan officer, 
Stanley Jenkins, discussed the ramifications of the due-on-sale 
clauses of the Notes and Deeds of Trust. Jenkins Deposition 
(2/6/86) at 21-28, Appendix 6 hereto. Moreover, when Mr. Cook 
expressed concern about the due-on-sale clause, Gate City's Mr. 
Jenkins told him that due-on-sale clauses would not be invoked 
since the assumption occurred with Gate City's approval. Id. at 
25. 
The uncontroverted submissions are all to the effect that 
Gate City did not communicate with Defendants after the loan 
closings, but collected loan payments from either Kilburn directly 
or Kilburn*s escrowed sale proceeds for approximately two and one-
half years. Finally, it is obvious that Gate City never did 
attempt to accelerate the loan payments based upon any 
unconsented-to transfer. 
Under such circumstances, no court would have allowed Gate 
City to have enforced the acceleration rights of Paragraph 17. 
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See, for example: Clontz v. Fortner, 399 P.2d 949, 953, 954 
(Idaho 1965) . 
Co Any Failure by Gate City to Execute a Written Document 
Accepting the Credit of the Transferee Prior to the Sale is 
Irrelevant, 
Gate City argues that in order for the Borrower to be 
released under Paragraph 17, it is necessary that prior to the 
transfer, Lender Gate City accept the credit of the transferee and 
approve the interest rate. 
In this regard, it is undisputed that Gate City issued a loan 
commitment containing the interest rate. This loan commitment was 
issued not to Defendants, but rather to Vaughn Cook. Secondly, 
Gate City had accepted Cook or C.C. International's credit by 
previously demonstrating its willingness to commit to make the 
loans knowing full well that the property would be transferred by 
C.C. International to Kilburn or timeshare purchasers and Kilburn 
would make the payments. Thus, Gate City demonstrated its intent 
to rely upon the credit of Kilburn. Moreover, Paragraph 17 of the 
Trust Deed merely provides for waiver in advance of transfer. 
Only in the event of waiver in advance is credit approval 
required. The provision relied upon states one way a borrower 
could know in advance of an anticipated transfer whether Gate City 
would opt to exercise the due-on-sale clause. After the fact, 
waivers are not foreclosed. See, e.g., PLC Landscape Construction 
v. Piccadilly Fish 'N Chips, Inc., 502 P.2d 562, 563 (Utah 1972). 
Thus, Paragraph 17 provides a way for the lender to waive the 
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right to declare the unpaid balance due and payable "prior to the 
sale or transfer. ..." (emphasis added), but gives no indication 
whatever that this is the exclusive manner in which Gate City can 
waive acceleration. The manner in which the waiver occurs is not 
an element to the release. 
There are indeed many ways Gate City could choose to waive 
the due-on-sale provisions after the transfer. See, e.g., 
Cooper v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan, 757 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 
App. 1988). For example, the Lender could enter into a written 
release of the transferror. A lender could also unequivocally 
demonstrate its waiver by: with knowledge that a transfer was 
going to take place, participate in the closing where at the 
transfers took place, and elect not to exercise any right it may 
have had following the closings to accelerate based upon the due-
on-sale clause for years following the closings, all the while 
sending all notices, and looking exclusively, to transferee and/or 
transferee's assignee of the property for payment. Defendants 
submit that either or both of these alternatives have been 
satisfied. 
D. C.C. International Executed a Written Assumption Agreement. 
Having established that Gate City either consented to the 
transfer or waived the due-on-sale acceleration provision, 
defendants submit that the second requirement to create a release 
has also been established, i.e., Borrower's successor-in-interest 
has executed a written assumption agreement. The second 
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prerequisite to release of these Defendants under Paragraph 17 of 
the Trust Deed is that Defendants' successor in interest and Gate 
City execute a written assumption agreement. Again, Defendants 
submit that C.C. International entered into such an agreement to 
assume the obligation to pay the mortgage. In each case C.C. 
International executed written Uniform Real Estate Contracts 
respectively transferring each of the subject properties from 
these Defendants to C.C. International. See, e.g., Appendix F to 
Gate City's brief. In each of the Uniform Real Estate Contracts, 
C.C. International undertook (by language specially added to the 
form) to assume the mortgage. The Uniform Real Estate Contract 
attached as Exhibit F to Gate City's brief, states, for example: 
Buyer agrees to take the property subject to the 
first mortgage to Gate City Mortgage dated December 30, 
1981, and to assume, or cause the same to be assumed by 
any subsequent purchaser. 
6. It is understood that there presently exists 
an obligation against said property in favor of Gate 
City Mortgage (which buyer [C.C. International] agrees 
to be responsible for) with an unpaid balance of 
$200,000.00 as of December 30, 1981. 
It is understood that at such times as the underlying 
mortgage is assumed by buyer [C.C. International] or its 
assigns . . . . 
(Emphasis and brackets added.) 
In one case, it is undisputed that Gate City's loan officer 
agreed to obtain a Defendant-Borrower's signature on a Uniform 
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Real Estate Contract bearing such assumption language for C.C. 
International. This document contained a provision whereby C.C. 
International would assume the obligation. Third Cook Affidavit 
at Paragraph 10. 
To the question of whether Gate City accepted or agreed to 
C.C. International's written assumption undertaking, the answer is 
a resounding "yes." Gate City drafted the Indemnity Agreements 
wherein C.C. International is described as the one who obtained 
the mortgage. 
"Whesreas the party of the first part [C.C. 
International] has obtained from the party of the second 
part [Gate City] a first mortgage loan for the principal 
balance of $200,000 on the following described 
property." 
This document is executed by Gate City Mortgage, thereby 
acknowledging that C.C. International had obtained a first 
mortgage loan from Gate City secured by the individual lots in 
question. 
Moreover, the "Indemnity Agreement" form executed by both 
Gate City and C.C. International contains expressly added language 
whereby C.C. International agrees to pay the indebtedness: 
"The obligation of the Party of the First Part 
in this agreement shall extend to the mortgage 
executed by, through or for the Party of the 
First Part [C.C. International] of assigns on 
the above premises. " 
By extending C.C. International's obligation under the agreement 
from just paying mechanics' liens and holding Gate City harmless 
therefrom, to the obligations to pay the mortgage and indemnify 
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Gate City therefrom, Gate City assented to the assumption by C.C. 
International, Thus, according to the language of Gate City's own 
form of Trust Deed and Promissory Note, there can be no dispute 
but that Gate City had the obligation to release the Defendants 
because Gate City had given up its acceleration right and assented 
to C.C. International's assumption of the mortgage obligations. 
E. Gate City's Reliance upon Paragraph 11 and Section 
57-15-8 of Utah Code Annotated, is Misplaced. 
Gate City claims it did not waive the rights of the due-on-
sale clause relying upon Paragraph 11 of the Trust Deed. This 
paragraph provides that: 
Any forbearance by lender in exercising any right or 
remedy hereunder otherwise afforded by applicable law 
shall not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any 
such right or remedy. The procurement of insurance or 
the payment of taxes or other liens or charged [sic.] by 
lender shall not be a waiver of lender's right to 
accelerate the maturity of the indebtedness secured by 
this deed of trust. 
The doctrine of Eiusdem Generis provides that where general rules 
follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a 
particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be 
construed in their widest extent but are to be held as applying 
only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as 
those specifically mentioned. Black's Law Dictionary 4th Ed. In 
the instant case, the general statement dealing with "any 
forbearance by lender" is followed by words of a specific and 
particular meaning, i.e.: 
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"The procurement of insurance of the payment or taxes or 
other liens or charges [sic] by lender shall not be a 
waiver of lenders right to accelerate. . . . " 
This category of factors deals exclusively with failure to pay 
certain charges or taxes. Rules of construction require the 
general enumeration to be held to this class. Gate City's attempt 
to construe this provision to cover due-on-sale-clause or 
acceleration rights cannot be justified. 
Gate City's reliance upon Section 57-18-8 of the Utah Code 
Annotated (as amended, 1986) is equally misplaced. Gate City 
claims that the procedure outlined must be followed to effect an 
assumption. In passing the Act dealing with assumptions of 
residential properties, however, the Legislature stated: 
The Legislature finds that clauses in instruments 
repiresenting security interests in residential property 
which allow a secured party to accelerate or mature an 
indebtedness secured by property, or increase the 
interest thereon upon the sale or transfer of the 
property or upon assumption of the indebtedness, in 
certain circumstances, constitute unreasonable 
restraints on alienation to the detriment of the public 
welfare. Utah Code Annotated, section 57-15-1 (1981, as 
amended). 
Gate City concludes without support or authority that this 
Act provides for mandatory procedure before an assumption can be 
effected. Plaintiff's brief at 40. This conclusion is simply 
untrue. Read in conjunction with section 57-15-8.5, Utah Code 
Annotated and the Legislature's intent pressed in section 57-15-1, 
it is clear that the provision is mandatory only if the lender 
seeks to accelerate or raise the interest rate. 
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CONCLUSION 
The foregoing material shows that the trial court properly 
interpreted the Indemnity Agreements, in finding that they 
satisfied all conditions necessary for a release of Defendants 
from the subject loan obligations. The trial court made no 
improper determinations of facts material and necessary to this 
decision, because Gate City failed to present adequate evidence of 
any such dispute for any material fact. Accordingly, the award of 
summary judgment in favor of Defendants should be affirmed. 
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